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Abstract 
We describe the relation between welfare growth and productivity growth. We argue that 
differences in productivity and productivity growth between sectors or countries are irrelevant 
from a policy perspective. Specialisation is based on the comparative advantages of countries. 
Since, by nature, some sectors witness higher productivity growth than others, so do countries. 
Although, at the global level, productivity growth and welfare growth are two sides of the same 
coin, at the national level they are not. The welfare effects of productivity growth in part leak 
away to consumers in other countries because technological progress is translated into a decline 
of export prices relative to import prices. Or stated differently, importing countries benefit from 
the lower prices due to technological innovations in exporting countries. These terms of trade 
effects of productivity growth on welfare do not only exist in theory. Empirically, we find 
significant and large terms of trade effects. Our overall conclusion is that once this trade 
perspective is taken into account, productivity is less attractive as a primary policy goal for 
governments. The primary task for governments is rather to create an environment in which 
private agents can explore the comparative advantages they have.  
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The targets for economic policy-making tend to vary over time. Whereas since the 1970s, at 
least i n Europe, the main goals for economic policy were directed towards improving 
government finance and the reduction of unemployment, more recently productivity growth has 
reappeared in the spotlight. The impressive upsurge in productivity growth on the other side of 
the Atlantic gave incentives for European countries to replicate this American success. The 
strategic goal of the Lisbon European Council in 2000 “to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” underlines this. 
However, although by definition, productivity and employment growth combined 
provide the basis for economic growth, taking productivity growth as a policy target is not self-
evident for four reasons. Firstly, in particular in a European context, improving labour market 
participation remains important and, at least, as urgent as productivity growth. For instance, the 
lower number of hours worked in the Netherlands completely explains the welfare gap between 
the Netherlands and the US. In fact, the Netherlands is even more productive in terms of GDP 
per hour worked. The ageing of the population in OECD countries not so much diminishes, but 
strengthens the importance of making better use of available labour supplies. Secondly, policy 
geared towards higher productivity growth could turn out to be considerably more difficult than 
that towards participation. For instance, the risk of government failure in innovation policy is 
more than imaginary. This chapter deals with productivity in relation to international trade: 
from the trade perspective we derive our third argument. Countries specialise on the basis of 
comparative advantages, which by definition implies that some countries have a higher 
productivity growth than others. Thus, for policy purposes, productivity differences between 
sectors or countries alone are largely irrelevant. Policy induced productivity growth can, in the 
absence of market failures, even lead an economy away from its comparative advantage and 
thereby have negative effects on welfare. Our last argument why productivity is not an 
appropriate policy goal is that the welfare effects of higher productivity in the exposed sectors 
in a global economy will in  part leak away to consumers in other countries through a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. In the presence of terms of trade effects, productivity growth   3 
leads to higher real GDP growth, but to a lesser extent to the growth of real income. This is not 
only a theoretical case, our empirical results indicate that these terms of trade effects can be 
substantial.  
This chapter deals with the last two arguments and has the following outline. Firstly, we 
discuss the implications of productivity growth from the perspective of ‘traditional’ trade theory 
and we consider the relation between welfare growth and productivity growth. Then, we discuss 
to what extent more recent theoretical insights affect our earlier conclusions. Finally, we present 
some empirical evidence as to the terms of trade effects of higher productivity growth. 
 
PRODUCTIVITY, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
 
At the global level, productivity growth is an important determinant of welfare growth. More 
production can directly be used to increase consumption, or to increase investment leading to 
higher future output and consumption possibilities. However, at the national level the link 
between production growth and consumption growth is not as straightforward. The development 
of the terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices) determines to what extent output 
growth is reflected in a real income growth and hence is available for domestic consumption 
growth. In this section we show that changes in the terms of trade are directly linked to 
differences in productivity growth across countries.  
Trade is an important determinant of a country’s welfare. Trade opens up markets and 
provides the opportunity for decoupling the production and consumption structure of a country. 
Trade allows for specialisation in production, which can boost productivity and welfare. In 
1776, Adam Smith already emphasised that an increased size of the market permits a greater 
degree of specialisation and therefore leads to higher productivity. Some time later, Ricardo
1 
introduced the concept of comparative advantage, the corner stone of international trade theory. 
Trade models show that, starting from an autarky position, opening up to trade is beneficiary to 
all countries involved. Even if a country has an absolute productivity disadvantage in the 
production of all commodities, it will profit from trade by specialising in the good where it has a 
comparative advantage; that is which it can produce relatively most efficient.  
                                                 
1 The classic reference is David Ricardo, the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation first published in 1817.    4 
For instance, in the famous Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade 
(the so-called HOS-model), countries export the commodities that use its abundant production 
factor most intensively. Countries with an abundant labour supply produce labour intensive 
goods and will have a relative low labour productivity, whereas capital abundant countries 
produce goods that require high labour productivity. Hence, productivity differences between 
countries are the result of differences in the availability of endowments. 
The original HOS-model made the assumption that countries differ only in their relative 
factor availability. This implies that all countries have access to a universal technology stock. 
Technologies (e.g. production functions) differ between sectors of industry but not between 
countries. This assumption together with the  insight that countries implicitly trade the 
production factors embedded in the commodities lead to the factor price equalisation theorem. 
This theorem states that prices of factors are equalised between countries. Hence, the law of one 
price does not only hold for commodities, but also for production factors. What are the 
implications when we analyse the welfare effects of technological change?  
Assume that the world economy is made up of two countries and that two sectors of 
industry exist, a dynamic sector (“manufacturing”) with technological change, and a traditional 
sector (“agriculture”) without technological change. Technological progress in manufacturing 
leads to an increase in the production possibilities in manufacturing and to a decline of the per 
unit production costs in manufacturing. Competition guarantees that the lower costs are 
reflected in a decline of the output prices in manufacturing relative to the output prices of 
agricultural products. Also  farmers see their consumption price index decline and therefore 
profit from the technological progress in manufacturing. The same holds for countries that trade 
which each other and produce according to their comparative advantages. Countries which are 
completely specialised in agriculture do not experience any productivity growth but see real 
income (their ability to consume) rise because of declining manufacturing output prices. 
Whether or not the country specialising in the dynamic sector has a higher welfare growth than 
the country specialising in the traditional sector depends on price and income elasticities of the 
different commodities and not on the specialisation pattern itself.
2  
                                                 
2 In extreme cases a high output growth rate can be combined with a declining welfare. This so called immiserizing 
growth can occur when a sectoral high productivity growth is combined with low price and income elasticity of 
demand for the output of this sector (Baghwati, 1958). In this paper we will not pay attention to these extreme cases.  
   5 
Hence, the HOS-analysis leads to a fascinating conclusion. Technological change may 
lead to different growth rates of per capita output between countries but has an ambiguous effect 
on the growth rates of welfare. It cannot be taken for granted that the country with the highest 
output growth rate will experience the highest welfare growth. The wedge between output 
growth and welfare growth results from change in the terms of trade.  
What are the policy implications of this analysis? The first lesson is that welfare growth 
is something different than productivity growth. Although at the global level productivity 
growth is a determinant of welfare growth, at a national level it can be welfare enhancing to 
specialise in a sector of industry with low productivity growth. Specialising according to the 
comparative advantage is equivalent to maximising welfare growth and levels; even when this 
means specialising in non-dynamic sectors of industry.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRADE AND GROWTH THEORY 
 
In reality, the world is more complicated than the above analysis suggests. Most products are 
not perfect substitutes but differ in quality and price. Most markets are not perfectly 
competitive; firms try to create some (temporary) market power. Setting prices above marginal 
costs is a necessity for enterprises to compensate for the sunk cost of investment in physical and 
human capital and investment in innovations. Rents are needed to survive in a dynamic 
environment where permanent innovation is needed to maintain a position in the market. 
Modern economic theory has captured many of these elements in the analytical framework.  
 
Modern trade models: product differentiation 
New trade models include the introduction of product differentiation (see, for instance, Helpman 
and Krugman, 1989 and 1990). This weakens the assumption of perfect competition. In these 
newer models, the relevant market structure is monopolistic competition which allows for 
temporary rents for producers. These kinds of models overcome the empirical shortcoming of 
the HOS-model. The latter predicts that countries will be either an importer or an exporter of a 
commodity, whereas in reality two way trade is more the rule rather than the exception.  
Modern trade models are mostly based on so-called Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, which 
presume that consumers like to choose and thus h ave a preference for differentiated products   6 
(see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Such models are able to explain two-way trade. This so-called 
love of variety approach creates a separate market for every variant of a product and gives the 
producer a degree of market power in his own niche market. This gives firms an incentive to 
differentiate their products from those of their competitors and, in so doing, maintain their 
position in the market. Hence, producers try to improve their products relative to the 
competitor’s products. As long as the market is contestable, competition will make mobile 
resources flow towards the most productive sectors, equalising the reward for the mobile factors 
across sectors.  
In monopolistic competition models, firms can have temporary rents as a result of 
innovation. As a consequence, the terms of trade effects can be less severe than in the case of 
perfect competition. However, similar to the previous section, these rents are always temporary. 
In the long run, these rents induce the entry of other (foreign) firms that produce a slightly 
different product. The enhanced competition reduces the monopolistic rents, and prices 
converge to the long run equilibrium, in which margins just make up for the sunk cost of the 
investment in innovation activities. Therefore, in the long run these models suggest that terms of 
trade dynamics transfer the gains of productivity increases to (foreign) consumers. Surprisingly, 
it is competition which drives product differentiation and it is also competition that, in the long 
run, causes gains to be passed on to consumers, domestic and foreign. Consequently, the 
conclusions from the HOS-model remain unchanged.  
 
Country specific circumstances and competitiveness  
Countries differ both in ‘natural’ (natural resources, geographical position etc.) and historically 
grown circumstances (accumulated capital, knowledge stock). To what extent does this more 
realistic view alter our conclusions? In this setting, specialisation patterns are not entirely 
determined by the factor endowments, but depend on the country’s specific circumstances as 
well. These circumstances can even cause a developed country to specialise in the traditional 
sector such as agriculture. Whether or not this is a problem or beneficiary for the welfare of a 
country depends both on supply side (e.g. technology) and demand side (e.g. preferences) 
developments.  
Countries can have problems if they specialise in sectors in which, at the global level, 
income and preferences driven demand growth is lower than the technology driven supply   7 
growth. Such a sector will permanently experience a surplus of labour. In case of rigid labour 
markets there are two options. The first is that the sector will become overstaffed and hence 
marginal productivity and income will decrease. The second is that labour will become 
unemployed.  
Problems will be less severe if a country specialises in sectors in which demand grows 
quickly. Firms will take expectations with respect to future demand into consideration when 
making investments decisions. Governments can influence the specific circumstances by public 
investments, and thereby support in such a way that the economy specialises in sectors in which 
demand growth is (more) in line with supply growth. But can governments identify these 
opportunities? Usually, governments lack the relevant information, which means that the risks 
of picking losers are quite substantial. For example, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) point to 
the fact that governments will pick losers rather than winners because losers have more 
incentives to lobby than firms that can survive without the help of government. Potentially, 
there could be a role for government if investments are not made because of coordination 
problems between private agents. To avoid the potential costs associated with picking the wrong 
sectors, a government should, in fact, ask market prices for public services in the case of public 
investments directed to specific sectors, regions or firms. If firms refuse or are not able to pay 
for the public services, there are apparently not enough potential benefits for the individual firm, 
signalling that they are losers instead of future winners. Only if the one who profits is the one 
who pays wasting taxpayers’ money is avoided.  
In fact, in models with specific national circumstances, factor price equalisation 
between countries does not take place due to the differences in production possibilities between 
countries. However, in the long run, the fruits of innovation will be passed on to domestic and 
foreign consumers, because production factors are still paid their marginal product. These 
models bring theory of innovation closer to reality, but the conclusion with respect to 
technology, terms of trade and welfare do not really differ from our earlier conclusions.  
 
New growth theory 
A final branch of the literature of relevance to the welfare effects of productivity growth is new 
growth theory. In new growth models, which have been developed since the mid-eighties, long-
term economic growth is explained as a result of explicit economic behaviour (e.g. Romer,   8 
1986). Technology is no longer exogenous and global, but directly related to economic 
processes in economies. In these models, a specific production factor (e.g. knowledge, R&D, 
blueprints) can be accumulated without diminishing returns. Purposeful investment in this 
production factor by economic agents aims at reaching a market position. This enables them - at 
least temporarily  - to exploit market power by setting prices above marginal costs. In the 
absence of market failures these rents will be just sufficient to pay the investment back.  
If technological development is endogenous and (in part) related to the economic 
process in a country, then countries can indeed have an advantage over their competitors by 
successful technological progress. The market power that this generates might indeed limit 
terms of trade effects. Again, we expect this effect to be only temporary, because the rents 
resulting from successful innovation induce innovation from competitors, which increases 
competition and forces producers to pass the fruits of the innovation to domestic and foreign 
consumers. In the absence of market failures this also holds for R&D investments. In 
competitive markets, the investments in i nnovative activities (e.g. R&D) can be paid by the 
rents accrued when selling the results. R&D has become an economic activity in itself, which 
has to compete for scarce endowments. Labour working in R&D cannot be active in other 
sectors. And it is only optimal for a country to specialise in R&D (or let us say in R&D 
intensive industries) when the country has a comparative advantage in these sectors of industry.  
The importance of the new growth literature for innovation policy comes from the 
possibilities to address market failures in R&D markets. National and international spillovers 
can be important and lead to an underinvestment in R&D. Government policy can indeed play a 
useful role in countering market failure due to external effects, information failures, incomplete 
markets etc. But when it comes to the welfare effects of high productivity growth, the story 
remains to a large extent unchanged. After all, competition is a major driver behind innovation. 
But competition forces enterprises to pass the fruits of innovation on to domestic as well as 
foreign consumers as well. Hence, in the long run, the welfare gains of the higher productivity 
growth through being specialised in dynamic sectors is rather small. In the next section we will 
show that this is not only a theoretical point, but is also relevant in the real world.  
 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
   9 
The observations in the previous section suggest that, according to more recent theories, terms 
of trade effects are likely to be less than can be expected from the HOS-model. Nevertheless, in 
the longer term, they are still likely to occur. Like with all puddings, the proof of this one will 
be in the empirical eating: the magnitude of the extent in which trade redistributes productivity 
gains over countries remains an empirical matter. In this section we first discuss an empirical 
analysis performed by the Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) of the welfare effects of the falling 
prices of ICT. This serves as an example of the welfare effects of a global new technological 
innovation. Then, we show our own empirical exercise. In this exercise, we analyse the impact 
of productivity changes of countries on relative prices over a long period. Such an exercise 
captures all elements that were presented in the previous section, such as specific factors, 
monopolistic competition and endogenous growth. Our results indicate that productivity growth 
leads to terms of trade effects that in the long term have substantial effects on the level of 
welfare.  
 
The welfare effects of the ICT revolution 
The recent innovations in ICT can be seen as an example of a positive global technology shock. 
Most (western) countries have access to the new technological innovation. Yet, not each country 
produces ICT. Who has benefited from the surge in ICT?  
The recent surge in productivity in the ICT sector has contributed quite significantly to 
the acceleration of GDP growth in ICT producing countries (see Chapter 6 for a further 
analysis). For example, in the US, TFP growth in the ICT sector was responsible for 25% of the 
acceleration of overall US labour productivity growth. Despite these productivity gains, 
increases in wages and profits in the ICT sector were quite modest. Fierce competition forced 
ICT producers to translate productivity gains into lower prices. Indeed prices of computers 
declined rapidly relative to other goods and services. Especially, if quality adjustments are taken 
into account, by using hedonic prices, the price declines of computers are substantial.  
Cheaper ICT induced firms to invest in ICT and substitute other production factors for 
ICT. Capital deepening in ICT equipment has been a major source of productivity growth in the 
late 1990s. For example, Van Ark (2001) shows that both the ICT-using and ICT-producing 
sector contributed between 0.5 and 0.9 percentage points to real GDP growth in a sample of 
developed countries.    10 
However, not only domestic users benefit from cheaper ICT equipment. Also foreign 
firms and foreign consumers cash in on the lower prices of ICT. The welfare distribution this 
brings about received far less attention. An exception is Bayoumi and Haacker (2002), which 
divides the welfare gain of ICT production into a production and a terms-of-trade component for 
29 countries.
3 Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) find that welfare benefits mainly accrue to users of 
ICT, not to producers, because of falling relative prices. We show their result for the fifteen 
countries with the highest growth of domestic demand (welfare). Further, we show how these 
countries received these gains: by production of ICT (contribution of ICT production to real 
GDP) or by buying cheap ICT abroad (contribution of terms of trade).  
 
Table 1: The Impact of falling ICT prices on GDP and Domestic Demand.  
1996-2000, annual contributions to change in growth rates, percentage points.  
  Domestic 
demand 
GDP  terms of trade 
United States  0.39  0.28  0.11 
Sweden  0.31  -0.10  0.41 
United Kingdom  0.31  0.30  0.01 
Singapore  0.30  6.71  -6.41 
Canada  0.28  0.10  0.18 
Korea  0.28  0.85  -0.57 
Australia  0.25  0.03  0.22 
Norway  0.22  0.03  0.19 
Denmark  0.21  -0.01  0.22 
Finland  0.21  -0.09  0.30 
Israel  0.21  0.27  -0.06 
Malysia  0.21  3.31  -3.10 
Hong Kong  0.20  0.20  0.00 
Ireland  0.20  2.10  -1.90 
Netherlands  0.19  0.13  0.06 
Source: Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) 
 
Table 1 shows that producing ICT is not a requirement to benefit from welfare gains of ICT. Of 
the five most specialised ICT countries only Singapore makes it to our top ten. The other 
countries with a yearly contribution of ICT of more than 1% point to real GDP growth (Ireland, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand) suffered such terms of trade losses that the growth of 
                                                 
3 Bayoumi and Haacker deflate output of the ICT sector and purchases of ICT with U.S. hedonic prices of ICT to 
adjust quality improvements of ICT identical in all countries. This implies that the reported figures should be 
interpreted as upper bound estimates of the terms-of-trade effects. Their results are published in IMF (2001) as well.    11 
welfare is lower then 0.20% a year. Some of the non-ICT producing countries do, however, 
appear in our table. In Denmark and Australia, the ICT sector is smaller then 1% of GDP. To 
conclude, a number of highly ICT specialising countries experienced large terms of trade losses, 
whereas the productivity gains in the ICT sector have gone mainly to ICT-using countries.  
The ICT example shows that technology-driven productivity growth in a sector of 
industry leads to a decline of output prices in this sector relative to other sectors and, therefore, 
to welfare gains for all consumers who directly or indirectly (in case of an intermediate product) 
buy the product in question. Indeed, it is competition on domestic and foreign markets which 
forces producers to enter the rat race called innovation and it is the same competition which 
forces producers to pass the fruits of this innovation on to domestic and foreign consumers.  
 
The relation between productivity growth differences on relative price changes  
We test empirically to what extent (international) competition eventually forces firms to 
translate productivity gains into lower prices. We cover different time spans to analyse if and 
how fast competition forces changes in marginal costs to be translated into lower prices. Thus, 
do countries with higher productivity growth relative to others experience a fall of their export 
prices relative to their competitors? We test this hypothesis by estimating the simple equation:  
 
(1)  t t oecd t i t c t i LP LP P P e a + D = D ) / ln( ) / ln( , , , ,  
 
Where Pi,t/P c,t is export prices in dollar terms of manufacturing goods of country i relative to the 
export prices of competitiveness-weighted average of 42 countries.
4 An increase in this index 
implies a real effective appreciation, which indicates an improvement of the terms of trade of 
country i at time t. LPi,t/LPoecd,t is the productivity index of country i relative to the OECD 
average.  
We included 25 OECD countries over the period 1971-2002 in our sample. Due to data 
limitations, we excluded the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Greece and Slovakia. For 
Mexico, we included data for the period 1984-2002. All data are from the OECD. Firstly, we 
estimated equation (1) for yearly growth rates. This gives an impression to what extent 
productivity increases are translated into lower prices within a year. We repeated this exercise   12 
for two sub-samples to obtain an impression of the robustness of the relation. However, 
imperfect competition may lead to temporary monopoly rents and hence slower adjustment of 
prices. We constructed 4 years periods to see to what extent productivity increases lead to lower 
prices in a four years period. Finally, we estimated the relation for the whole sample period. 
Table 2 reports the results.  
 
Table 2: The impact of productivity growth on relative export prices 
  a  t-statistic  R2-adjusted  Number of obs. 
Yearly, 1971-2002   -0.26***  -2.98  0.01  787 
Yearly, 1971-1986  -0.31**  -2.34  0.00  387 
Yearly, 1987-2002   -0.23*  -1.86  0.01  400 
4-years, 1971-2002  -0.59***  -3.67  0.05  197 
4-years, 1971-1986  -0.58**  -2.44  0.02  97 
4-years, 1986-2002  -0.59***  -2.80  0.07  100 
32-years, 1971-2002  -0.91***  -3.25  0.27  25 
*, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Growth of productivity has a significant effect on relative export prices. Within a year, about a 
quarter of productivity growth in a country is translated into lower export prices. Productivity 
changes are not translated completely into prices instantaneously indicating some degree of 
monopolistic competition or specific factors. However, in the long run competition forces prices 
to decline further. In a four year period, this share has increased to almost 60%. This result 
corresponds with that of Acemoglu and Ventura (2001), who find that a 1%-point faster growth 
is associated with a 0.6 %-point deterioration in the terms of trade. Our results are quite robust 
for sub-samples. Over the whole period, 90% of productivity growth has been translated into 
lower export prices. Hence, in the long run terms of trade effects caused by country specific 
productivity gains have a significant impact on welfare. Of course, the benefits of higher 
productivity have not vanished. Other countries, with lower productivity growth have had 
positive welfare effects due to improved terms of trade. Hence foreign consumers benefited 
from the relative price declines. Again, this exercise illustrates the importance of taking the 
terms of trade effects into the productivity analysis and policy making.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
4 See Durand (1992) for a extensive description of the construction of competitiveness weighted export price indices.    13 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
At the global level, technological progress and welfare growth are two sides of the same coin. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that it is beneficial for a country to be specialised in 
sectors of industry with a high productivity growth. The welfare gains from trade come from the 
specialisation in accordance with the comparative advantage of countries. Because productivity 
growth inherently differs between sectors of industry, this, by definition, implies that some 
countries will witness higher productivity growth than others. This, however, does not 
automatically imply that the low productivity growth country will experience a lower welfare 
growth.  
Relative international  prices react on differences in productivity growth between 
countries. In competitive domestic and international markets, productivity growth in a sector 
will be transferred into lower output and export prices. Consequently, productivity growth will 
in part leak away to consumers in other countries. Importing countries, which themselves do not 
experience any productivity growth, benefit because they are making use of the cheaper 
products produced elsewhere. Hence, in the long run, the welfare effects of productivity growth 
are partly offset by a deterioration of the terms of trade of a country.  
This is not only a theoretical case. Our empirical analysis shows that, not only in the 
long run, but also in the short run, terms of trade effects are substantial. Overall, the welfare 
effects of a relatively high productivity growth are smaller than expected at first sight. This 
underlines all the more the importance of careful analysis when embarking on a government 
quest for higher productivity growth. If not, then higher productivity would not only imply an 
attractive present for consumers in other countries, but an actual burden on the welfare of the 
consumers in the country in question. Helping thy neighbour and begging thy citizen seems 
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